economy – Yetu Infotech Collective https://yetu.coop Growing the Internet from Below Mon, 27 Jan 2025 08:00:17 +0000 en-ZA hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.7.1 https://yetu.coop/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Yetu-ICON-logo-black-on-white-PNG-1-150x150.png economy – Yetu Infotech Collective https://yetu.coop 32 32 The AI craze https://yetu.coop/the-ai-craze/ Sun, 19 Jan 2025 07:58:09 +0000 https://yetu.coop/?p=2068 Date Published : usp_custom_field : 19 Jan 2025  From the Reports from the Economic Front blog by Marty Hart-Landsberg     Are you one of those loudly demanding that companies create AI-powered systems to amuse you on Facebook, be your online sexual partner, offer therapy 24-7, provide answers to your search questions, write the news, or enhance management surveillance of worker activity? I would guess not. […]]]>

Date Published : usp_custom_field : 19 Jan 2025

 

From the Reports from the Economic Front blog by Marty Hart-Landsberg

 

 

Are you one of those loudly demanding that companies create AI-powered systems to amuse you on Facebook, be your online sexual partner, offer therapy 24-7, provide answers to your search questions, write the news, or enhance management surveillance of worker activity? I would guess not. And yet, everywhere you look, AI is being promoted as the ticket to a more productive and fulfilling life.

The fact of the matter is that the AI craze is being driven by tech companies, not our needs. And these companies are working nonstop to sell us on how much we need AI in our lives. There is a lot at stake for them; if they succeed, they stand to make a fortune. Of course, they couldn’t care less about the social consequences of their effort. It’s all a quest for what appears a big pot of gold.

However, the AI craze has gone on long enough for us to start drawing some plausible conclusions about where it is leading. Most importantly, there are good reasons to believe that big tech will never deliver the transformative AI it is promising. One big reason is that AI’s ongoing development is seriously constrained by data limitations and unexplained hallucinations [see below] which make its output unreliable. Another is that the financial costs involved in developing and operating ever more sophisticated systems is staggering and likely to prove prohibitive.

But we cannot afford to stand on the sidelines and let the AI craze continue unchecked, even if we are confident of its eventual passing. The reason is that it comes at great public cost. It is being subsidized by governments at all levels, robbing our cities and states of needed tax revenue. Even more importantly, it is driving us ever faster to a future of climate chaos.

False Promises

First things first – when people talk about AI, they normally have in mind generative artificial intelligence (or machine learning AI). OpenAI started the AI craze with its November 2022 release of ChatGPT, where the GPT stands for Generative Pre-Trained Transformer. This chatbot, and later versions, including by competitor companies, requires both large amounts of data, mostly taken from the web, and an algorithm called a transformer that enables it to draw on that data to determine, based on probability, a response to prompts. As the tech writer Megan Crouse explains,

“The model doesn’t ‘know’ what it’s saying, but it does know what symbols (words) are likely to come after one another based on the data set it was trained on. The current generation of artificial intelligence chatbots, such as ChatGPT, its Google rival Bard and others, don’t really make intelligently informed decisions; instead, they’re the internet’s parrots, repeating words that are likely to be found next to one another in the course of natural speech. The underlying math is all about probability.”

Generative AI is just the beginning according to tech companies, who see a future of rapid improvements, with more data and more computing power enabling them to develop systems coming ever closer to human performance. Interactive artificial intelligence (IAI) capable of deciding on and taking a number of different actions to complete assigned tasks without step-by-step prompts comes next. And then, in the not-too-distant future, we can expect artificial general intelligence or AGI systems with the ability to think, learn, and solve problems on their own. According to the cheerleaders, these systems will enable us to develop new vaccines, lower greenhouse gas emissions, boost productivity and income, eliminate uninteresting and low paid work, and the list goes on.

But despite substantial spending on AI development, which has led to ever faster and more capable generative AI systems, AI companies are finding the returns disappointing. As the tech writer Edward Zitron comments,

“Bloomberg reported that OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic are struggling to build more advanced AI, and that OpenAI’s ‘Orion’ model – otherwise known as GPT-5 – ‘did not hit the company’s desired performance,’ and that ‘Orion is so far not considered to be as big a step up’ as it was from GPT-3.5 to GPT-4, its current model. You’ll be shocked to hear the reason is that because ‘it’s become increasingly difficult to find new, untapped sources of high-quality, human-made training data that can be used to build more advanced AI systems’.”

AI companies have encouraged investors to view their industry through the prism of the semiconductor industry, where new investments have produced a steady record of breakthroughs yielding ever smaller and more powerful chips. But this has not been the AI experience despite significant outlays for ever bigger data centers with more powerful machines. And data limitations, as Zitron pointed out, are one of the big reasons.

Said simply, AI companies have largely picked the Internet clean of human-generated data and without new large data sets their systems cannot develop new capabilities. Their response: prompt their current systems with questions and requests for information to generate new data. But there are serious problems with this strategy. One is that the existing data, largely scraped from the web, includes all sorts of racist, sexist, and ill-informed posts and articles. Those are part of the database that the system draws on when generating new material for its training. As a result, these harmful notions and misinformation get more deeply embedded.

But there is an even more serious problem. Feeding the system with its own responses creates a feedback loop that yields an ever-narrowing range of responses. While human generated output varies considerably, AI models are structured to provide responses based on likely probabilities. This means that their responses will, if their training data is largely self-generated, soon converge on the model’s determined “conventional wisdom.” And this limits the reliability and usefulness of the system.

AI Hallucinations

The New York Times, in an article titled “When AI’s Output Is a Threat to AI Itself,” highlights the problem:

“Imagine a medical-advice chatbot that lists fewer diseases that match your symptoms, because it was trained on a narrower spectrum of medical knowledge generated by previous chatbots…

“Just as a copy of a copy can drift away from the original, when generative AI is trained on its own content, its output can also drift away from reality, growing further apart from the original data that it was intended to imitate.

“In a paper published last month in the journal Nature, a group of researchers in Britain and Canada showed how this process results in a narrower range of AI output over time – an early stage of what they called ‘model collapse’.

“This problem isn’t just confined to text. Another team of researchers at Rice University studied what would happen when the kinds of AI that generate images are repeatedly trained on their own output – a problem that could already be occurring as AI-generated images flood the web.

“They found that glitches and image artifacts started to build up in the AI’s output, eventually producing distorted images with wrinkled patterns and mangled fingers.”

Then, there is the potentially more serious problem of hallucinations, which refers to AI output that has no basis in reality – dates, times, places, events can be entirely made up. As Zitron notes, “The hallucination problem is one that is nowhere closer to being solved – and, at least with the current technology – may never go away, and it makes it a non-starter for a great many business tasks, where you need a high level of reliability.”

Financial Consequences

These technological challenges have their financial consequences. To this point, AI companies are shelling out a lot of money to advance their AI systems without much to show for it in terms of financial rewards. Microsoft’s experience is representative:

“Microsoft has spent a staggering amount of money on AI – and serious profits likely remain many years out, if they’re ever realized.

“The tech giant revealed that during the quarter ending in June [2024], it spent an astonishing $19-billion in cash capital expenditures and equipment, the Wall Street Journal reports – the equivalent of what it used to spend in a whole year a mere five years ago.

“Unsurprisingly, most of those $19-billion were related to AI, and roughly half was used for building out and leasing data centers.”

Not surprisingly, this record has led some investment analysts to raise warnings about the future of the AI industry. As the New York Times reports, Mr. Covello, the head of stock research at Goldman Sachs,

“jolted markets with a research paper that challenged whether businesses would see a sufficient return on what by some estimates could be $1-trillion in AI spending in the coming years. He said generative artificial intelligence, which can summarize text and write software code, made so many mistakes that it was questionable whether it would ever reliably solve complex problems.

“Mr. Covello challenged the notion that the costs of AI would decline, noting that costs have risen for some sophisticated technologies like the machines that make semiconductors. He also criticized AI’s capabilities.

“‘Overbuilding things the world doesn’t have use for, or is not ready for, typically ends badly,’ he said.”

At Great Public Cost

It is tempting to stand on the sidelines and let big tech pursue its dreams. If they come to fruition, great, and if they don’t, they are the ones to lose. But that is not the way things work. We are all paying a high cost for their efforts.

One example: states and cities have been competing to attract data centers with enormous tax breaks. According to an investigation by the Oregonian newspaper, “Oregon has one of the nation’s largest and fastest-growing data center industries.” And a major reason is that the big tech companies – like Amazon, Apple, Google, and Meta – receive “some of the most generous tax breaks anywhere in the world. Data centers don’t employ many people, but the wealthy tech companies that run them enjoy Oregon tax giveaways worth more than $225-million annually.”

These tax breaks mean less money for things we do need – like schools, libraries, and parks. And the data centers themselves occupy land that could be used for more productive purposes.

An ever-greater concern is that these data centers place huge demands on our energy sector – demands that pose critical challenges for our communities. As the Oregonian explains:

“Data center demand is soaring because of artificial intelligence, which uses massive amounts of electricity for advanced computation. These powerful machines already consume more than 10% of all of Oregon’s power and forecasters say data center power use will be at least double that by 2030 – and perhaps some multiple higher…

“Data centers’ power needs are triggering expensive upgrades to the Northwest’s power lines and prompting construction of new power plants. There is growing concern among ratepayer advocates, regulators and politicians that households will end up bearing much of the cost of data center growth through higher residential power bills.”

Oregon is no outlier. According to the New York Times, “There are already more than 5,000 data centers in the US, and the industry is expected to grow nearly 10 percent annually. Goldman Sachs estimates that AI will drive a 160 percent increase in data center power demand by 2030.”

This exploding demand for electricity translates directly into a dramatic growth in fossil fuel use, including coal, and thus, US greenhouse emissions, increasing the likelihood of climate catastrophes. However, as the New York Times lets us know, our tech leaders don’t seem to care:

“Microsoft said its emissions had soared 30 percent since 2020 because of its expansion of data centers. Google’s emissions are up nearly 50 percent over the past five years because of AI.

“Eric Schmidt, the former chief executive of Google, recently said that the artificial intelligence boom was too powerful, and had too much potential, to let concerns about climate change get in the way.

“Schmidt, somewhat fatalistically, said that ‘we’re not going to hit the climate goals anyway’, and argued that rather than focus on reducing emissions, ’I’d rather bet on AI solving the problem’.”

President Biden, in his farewell address to the nation, warned about the “potential rise of a tech industrial complex that can pose real dangers for our country.” And yet, as the executive editor of The American Prospect, David Dayen, points out,

“the same week that he issued this warning, Biden signed an executive order that gives that tech-industrial complex an enormous gift, by making the creation of data centers for artificial intelligence a national-security imperative. The order aims to accelerate the production of data centers (in ways not afforded to, say, the production of housing for human beings), and requires the leasing of federal land owned by the Pentagon and the Department of Energy to build data centers.”

What we have here is a prime example of capitalism’s destructive logic. •

This article first published on the Reports From the Economic Front website.

Martin Hart-Landsberg is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon; and Adjunct Researcher at the Institute for Social Sciences, Gyeongsang National University, South Korea. His areas of teaching and research include political economy, economic development, international economics, and the political economy of East Asia. He maintains a blog Reports from the Economic Front.

 

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We need a full public service internet – state-owned infrastructure is just the start https://yetu.coop/we-need-a-full-public-service-internet-state-owned-infrastructure-is-just-the-start/ Thu, 21 Jul 2022 04:38:57 +0000 https://yetu.coop/?p=1455 by Christian Fuchs in the Conversation  on 2 December 2019.  The UK Labour Party’s 2019 election manifesto contains plans to bring BT’s internet infrastructure business into public ownership by creating British Broadband and to roll out and provide superfast broadband free to all households and businesses. This would be funded via a digital tax on the profits of internet giants such […]]]>

by Christian Fuchs in the Conversation  on 2 December 2019. 

The UK Labour Party’s 2019 election manifesto contains plans to bring BT’s internet infrastructure business into public ownership by creating British Broadband and to roll out and provide superfast broadband free to all households and businesses. This would be funded via a digital tax on the profits of internet giants such as Amazon, Google and Facebook.

I believe this will help improve Britain’s relatively poor rate of full-fibre internet connection. But we also need to address the wider problems faced by internet users. The consequences of the current model of digital capitalism have been surveillanceprivacy violationsdigital monopoliesfake newsfilter bubblespost-truth politicsdigital authoritarianismonline nationalismdigital tabloids and high-speed flows of superficial content. To change this, we need a full public service internet.

The current internet consists of the technological infrastructure, the platforms (websites and apps) that provide digital services, and the content generated by and stored on these platforms. A public service internet would comprise public organisations and co-operatives that provide all three of these elements on a not-for-profit basis.

Publicly-owned telecoms companies, as Labour is proposing, are one important way to provide the infrastructure aspect of a public service internet. But community-owned networks – such as B4rnFreifunkGuifi or Sarantaporo – have also started to emerge as another, complementary alternative. Community networks have a special role in rural and other areas where private corporations find it unprofitable to roll out communications infrastructure. Research has shown that partnering with public and municipal services, rather than competing with them, can work well for these organisations.

Public platforms

For public service internet platforms, existing public service media organisations such as the BBC can provide one important dimension. BBC iPlayer, for example, is already an important rival to the likes of Netflix, Apple TV and Amazon Prime. Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn has suggested the creation of British Digital Corporation to provide content from the BBC, public archives and even an alternative social network.

Another dimension is offered by platform cooperatives, democratically governed internet platforms owned by their users and workers. Examples are the collaboration platform Loomio, the photography co-op Stocksy, the online music co-op ResonateFairbnb and Taxiapp. By focusing on public benefit instead of profit, these platforms can protect users’ privacy instead of constantly watching them in order to sell their data.

A public service internet could raise the level of online discussions. Africa Studio/Shutterstock

A public service internet could also democratise the ownership and use of entertainment content, so much of which is currently dominated by transnational multimedia corporations that effectively control popular culture.

Imagine that public service broadcasters, museums, libraries and other public organisations could make all of their audio and visual archive material available on a public service YouTube under a Creative Commons licence. Groups of users in schools, community centres, local associations and so on could reuse that material for creating their own videos and podcasts. Public institutions could even feature selected user-generated content.

We could then watch, listen to, discuss and engage with audiences’ creative co-productions on the BBC, in the British Library, the British Museum, the Tate galleries. This would update public service media’s purposes to advance democracy, culture and education could be updated to also include the public values of digital participation and digital creativity.

Revitalised culture

In this way, a public service internet would not only offer a different model of ownership and governance but also a different culture and morality, regulated not by the market but by fairness, democracy and justice. These values could help revitalise online debate in the age of filter bubbles, post-truth and fake news.

Just as public service broadcasters like the BBC commit to advancing public values, public service internet organisations should commit to informing and educating users and fostering democratic communication and cooperation. This digital public sphere would also provide the time and space for discussions that could raise the level of online debate to address the culture of fake news and digital tabloids.

The 2018 Alternative Internet Survey, part of the EU-funded research project netCommons, found that internet users have a large interest in an alternative, not-for-profit internet, so there is the potential appetite to create one. To make it happen, the various components could be funded from a combination of digital taxes on internet giants and an expanded digital licence fee. This could be organised as a progressive charge based on annual income and not just be paid by households but also companies, especially large ones, that benefit from using a free public internet connection.

The Labour Party’s suggestion that the internet should be free to access allows us to think more broadly about how alternatives to the corporate internet should look. A public service internet has the potential to reinvigorate both public service media and community media in the digital age.

 

 

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Digital colonialism under the Western model of technology https://yetu.coop/digital-colonialism-under-the-western-model-of-technology/ Wed, 20 Jul 2022 15:50:44 +0000 https://yetu.coop/?p=1452 Big Tech is reinventing colonialism in the digital era says Michael Kwet in discussing centralized control of the Internet at the root of current problems like privacy and monopoly power and the associated rise of Big Tech. In this 2 part series, Michael Kwet of the Yale Privacy Lab presents an analysis of digital colonialism […]]]>

Big Tech is reinventing colonialism in the digital era says Michael Kwet in discussing centralized control of the Internet at the root of current problems like privacy and monopoly power and the associated rise of Big Tech. In this 2 part series, Michael Kwet of the Yale Privacy Lab presents an analysis of digital colonialism under the Western model of technology Originally published March 27, 2019

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National Infrastructure Plan (NIP) 2050 https://yetu.coop/national-infrastructure-plan-nip-2050/ Fri, 11 Mar 2022 14:16:00 +0000 https://yetu.coop/?p=1115 Date Published : usp_custom_field : 11 March 2022 The government’s  SA Connect aimed to deliver widespread broadband access to 90% of the country by 2020 but the 2016 targets have not yet been met. The new National Infrastructure Plan (NIP) 2050, was gazetted on Friday, 11 March. In the NIP document, government has outlined a […]]]>

Date Published : usp_custom_field : 11 March 2022

The government’s  SA Connect aimed to deliver widespread broadband access to 90% of the country by 2020 but the 2016 targets have not yet been met.

The new National Infrastructure Plan (NIP) 2050, was gazetted on Friday, 11 March.

In the NIP document, government has outlined a “vision for a seamless digital infrastructure”. The document, published by the department of public works & infrastructure, highlights what government wants to achieve in ICT and other sectors by the end of the decade.

The NIP proposes a multitude of solutions. Highlights include:

  •  There must be continuous improvement in driving towards universal readiness for a digital world, including the achievement of universal broadband access, digitisation of government services, deepening of ICT skills and capabilities, and enablement of e- commerce, digital finance and digital entrepreneurship.
  • There must be a strong and competitive private sector that continues to invest, maintain, upgrade and innovate.
  • A public sector broadband and digital services delivery model must effectively engage the private sector.
  • There must be sufficient and sustainable public and private finance that enables continuous improvement in delivering universal broadband and supportive ICT services to underserved communities and households and to public institutions.
  •  Government must have substantial internal professional and technical capability in procuring and overseeing the implementation of universal broadband delivery and e- government services that operate at a global standard suited to South African conditions and that are continuously improving.
  • Spectrum must be treated as a national resource that is optimised for South Africa’s development. It should be done in a way that supports enhanced competition as well as universal access obligations.

These are some of the ways government wants to achieve its goals in ICT:

  • High-speed broadband must be available in underserved areas and must be affordable and accessible to low-income communities.
  • Government services and buildings must be digitally enabled. All government buildings must be connected with high-speed broadband.
  • Regulation must enable competitive and universally accessible broadband. Communications regulator Icasa must be held accountable for the quality of regulation with respect to spectrum, pricing, infrastructure sharing and similar.
  • Government capacity to design and procure digital infrastructure and services must be technically sound. There will be commitment to institutional stability, good governance and appropriate “capacitation” through senior appointments.
  • Private sector participation in achieving universal broadband access is key. The model of delivery will increasingly leverage vibrant private sector participation and blended financing. – © 2022 NewsCentral Media

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The Dialectic of Tech and Society https://yetu.coop/the-dialectic-of-tech-and-society/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 04:54:53 +0000 https://yetu.coop/?p=1103 Date Published : usp_custom_field : February 2022 Contribution to GTI Forum Technology and the Future by Brian Tokar Since the heyday of technological determinism in the 1960s, many authors have written eloquently about how developments in technology are more typically the outcome of particular social and economic arrangements. Some contributions that have significantly shaped my own […]]]>

Date Published : usp_custom_field : February 2022

Contribution to GTI Forum Technology and the Future by Brian Tokar

Since the heyday of technological determinism in the 1960s, many authors have written eloquently about how developments in technology are more typically the outcome of particular social and economic arrangements. Some contributions that have significantly shaped my own thinking include the following:

  • Lewis Mumford’s observation that inventions like glass and steam engines were first developed for mainly ornamental and ceremonial purposes (opening heavy temple doors in the latter case), centuries before they were mobilized for more practical uses.1
  • Murray Bookchin’s account of how Iroquois and Inca societies, one increasingly egalitarian and the other rigidly hierarchical, relied upon very similar late Paleolithic “toolkits.”2
  • Langdon Winner’s research on agricultural mechanization, especially Cyrus McCormick’s famous reaper. Winner concluded that various innovations in the manufacture of McCormick’s reapers at first made them more costly and less reliable, but they helped concentrate economic power more firmly in the hands of production plant managers.3
  • David Noble’s detailed examination of the origins of numerically controlled machine tools in the mid-twentieth century. His conclusion is similar to Winner’s: to implement this initial step toward industrial automation, manufacturers had to overlook widespread inefficiencies and a loss of much of the knowledge and flexibility that was shared among manual machine operators. The perceived overarching benefit, however, was to disempower shop floor labor and concentrate knowledge and control in the hands of engineers and managers.4
  • Andreas Malm’s more recent exploration of the origins of “fossil capital,” i.e., why British textile manufacturers in the mid-eighteenth century transitioned from riverside watermills to coal-fired steam engines. As Malm has examined in detail, watermills remained far more efficient and reliable for several decades into the coal era, and there was never a shortage of potential sites for new water-powered textile mills. However, rural workers who lived along England’s riverbanks were far more independent-minded, and more likely to abandon the mills when working conditions became too onerous, than often-desperate urban workers. The latter proved far more willing to work long hours under harsh conditions in steam-powered mills, which could be located anywhere. Once the transition began, the ability of steam-powered mills to operate around the clock in all seasons enabled production increases and an expansion of global trade that would have been unimaginable a generation earlier.5

These examples reveal a profoundly dialectical relationship between technological developments and social evolution. Technologies emerge as a response to social needs—as perceived by those best able to invest in new innovations—and then serve to enhance and reinforce the social conditions that initially fostered them. Technologies emerge from what Bookchin called their “social matrix,” and then ultimately reify the patterns and contradictions of the social realities that shaped their development.

This pattern is markedly reflected in two technological developments that I have spent considerable time and energy grappling with over several decades: nuclear power and genetic engineering. Nuclear power was mainly the product of a perceived military necessity during the first two decades of the Cold War: to maintain a steady supply of nuclear technology and engineering expertise through advancing the myth of the “peaceful atom.” It was massively subsidized by the US government (and ultimately the Soviet Union, France, and others), and most of the nuclear plants in the US were built in the immediate aftermath of the 1970s “energy crisis.”

Hundreds of nuclear power plants were initially planned in the US, but their development was cut short by rising public opposition, a scarcity of investment capital, and the unwillingness of people in most US states to allow utilities to pass on their massive capital costs to utility ratepayers. Attempted nuclear “revivals” during the George W. Bush and Barack Obama presidencies foundered in the face of continued public skepticism, uncontrollable cost overruns, and the lack of a viable solution to the proliferation of nuclear waste. Catastrophic accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima helped reinforce public opposition, and needed safety enhancements in the aftermath of those events raised the economic stakes even higher. While nuclear proponents continue to promote the myth that a new generation of reactors will lower costs and alleviate safety concerns, the fallacies behind the myth are just as transparent as they were when these claims were first advanced during the 1980s.

The development of genetically engineered varieties of staple agricultural crops similarly reflects the social matrix and distinct corporate agendas from which the technology emerged. Just a few years after scientists at Stanford University demonstrated the feasibility of splicing DNA from one living organism into the cells of another, Monsanto began to investigate whether this new technology could be mobilized to enable crops to tolerate high doses of chemical herbicides. What problem was Monsanto trying to solve? Patents on some of their top-selling products, glyphosate-based “Roundup” family weed-killers, were going to expire in 2000, and they needed to find a way to keep selling more Roundup, even as cheaper, generic formulations were likely to hit the market.

The first Roundup-tolerant soybean, corn, and cotton seeds were sold to farmers in 1996, along with a contract mandating that growers buy their herbicide from Monsanto, and their use quickly skyrocketed. Why? Because farmers facing overwhelming pressure to cut costs could now spray Roundup indiscriminately throughout the growing season, saving on cultivation costs and initially reducing their use of chemicals that had more demanding spraying schedules—though the latter advantage quickly faded once the problem of Roundup-tolerant weeds swept the US Midwest. Also, Monsanto went on a massive merger spree, buying up many of the largest seed companies in the US and other countries, eventually controlling more than a quarter of the world’s commercial seed market. Today, as much as 85 percent of all the crop acreage planted with GMO seeds consists of crop varieties that have been genetically engineered to tolerate applications of Roundup, even as Monsanto—the technology’s most aggressive developer and promoter by far—has been merged into Bayer’s global agribusiness and pharmaceutical empire.

But what of all the claims about future, more beneficial uses of GMOs? Does genetically engineered agriculture have a place in the transition to a healthier and more ecologically benign agricultural system? The evidence clearly suggests otherwise, confirming just how much the technology is wedded to its initial raison-d’être. For twenty-five years, Monsanto and other companies have promised a host of agronomic and nutritional benefits tied to further GMO research, but none have come to pass. Genetic engineering offers no systematic advantage for crop yields, and when Monsanto made headlines during the 2010s with products like a low-trans-fat soybean and a drought-tolerant corn variety, it turned out that both traits were products of conventional plant breeding. These products’ sole GMO trait was—no surprise—tolerance to Roundup-brand herbicides. While sophisticated biotech diagnostics often play a facilitative role in current plant breeding research, enabling scientists to scan offspring for particular genetic markers, the purported benefits from genetic manipulation of plant cells have time and again been shown to be entirely mythical.

A related approach that has made headlines in recent years is the gene editing method enabled by CRISPR technology, which has produced such innovations such as apples and potatoes that don’t turn brown with age. But what do these products offer, beyond the ability for companies to sell fresh produce with a longer cosmetically acceptable shelf life? It is not yet clear what other aspects of declining freshness are masked by the lack of visible browning. And recent evidence suggests that the advertised “precision” of CRISPR-based gene editing is far less reliable than claimed, with the unintended consequences of edited genomes frequently mirroring those of conventional genetic engineering. Thus the development of GMOs and gene-edited crops reaffirms the many ways in which new technologies both reflect and help reinforce the commercial imperatives, and the larger social matrix, from which they emerged.


1. Lewis Mumford, Technics and Human Development (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1966).
2. Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy (Pao Alto, CA: Cheshire Books, 1982).
3. Langdon Winner, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” Daedalus 109, no. 1 (Winter 1980): 121–136.
4. David Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (London: Routledge, 2011).
5. Andreas Malm, Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming (New York: Verso, 2016).

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Competition in the Global Economy https://yetu.coop/competition-in-the-global-economy/ Mon, 07 Sep 2020 14:25:00 +0000 https://yetu.coop/?p=1119 Date Published : usp_custom_field : 7 September 2020 The Competition Commission of South Africa’s 2020 report on Competition in the Global Economy.   According to Webber Wentzel: ​​​​The Competition Commission (Commission) has called for comments by 5 October 2020, on its paper titled “Competition in the Digital Economy“. Over the last few years, competition and regulatory authorities […]]]>

Date Published : usp_custom_field : 7 September 2020

The Competition Commission of South Africa’s 2020 report on Competition in the Global Economy.

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According to Webber Wentzel:

​​​​The Competition Commission (Commission) has called for comments by 5 October 2020, on its paper titled Competition in the Digital Economy. Over the last few years, competition and regulatory authorities across the world have been grappling with multi-faceted competition and regulatory issues due to the rise of large tech players, and advances in the digital economy. Many of these large tech firms have faced intense regulatory scrutiny.

The paper details competition and regulatory issues in the South African digital economy and sets out the Commission’s intended strategic actions in relation to competition law issues, and proposed strategic actions for other regulators to consider concerning their respective regulatory areas, namely telecommunication and broadcasting, data protection and financial services regulators.

Many of the Commission’s strategic actions seek to revolutionise the manner in which competition law is applied to digital firms in South Africa. The Commission has also provided suggested actions for firms operating within the digital economy to mitigate the risk of competition law contraventions. The paper recognises that the digital economy in South Africa cuts across all markets in which goods and services utilise an internet base for production, distribution, trade and consumption by different agents. Firms participating in the digital economy with the usage of social media platforms, search platforms, share-economy platforms and financial services, to name but a few, should begin to carefully consider the possible effects of the Commission’s suggested strategic actions on their businesses.

The table below sets out a brief summary of the key competition law issues identified, as well as some of the strategic actions recommended by the Commission.

Key competition issues Commission’s suggested strategic actions
Merger control
  • South Africa’s history in assessing mergers in the digital economy suggests there may have been under enforcement in this area.
  • Jurisdiction (eg many social media platforms are internationally based).
  • Contemplating or investigating relevant theories of harm particular to mergers in the digital space.
  • Existing merger tools may be ill-designed for digital merger control.
  • Issuing a guidance note which clarifies the valuation of assets for digital companies in respect of merger thresholds.
  • Requiring specific tech companies that dominate different digital markets in South Africa to inform the Commission of all small domestic acquisitions.
  • Prioritising digital markets within merger control for the 2020-2025 period.
  • Developing a practice note on the assessment of digital market mergers, updating the existing toolkits to account for the specific features of digital markets.
  • Issuing a practice note on the assessment of merger creep and when such mergers would warrant intervention.
  • Ensuring that domestically notifiable global tech mergers are concurrently filed in South Africa and other major jurisdictions.
Cartel conduct
  • The use of algorithms to collude.
  • Big data being used to facilitate collusion.
  • The ability of the competition authorities to detect and investigate cartels operating in the digital economy.
  • Jurisdictional issues – many digital firms may lack an incorporated entity and presence in South Africa.
  • Developing appropriate tools for detecting digital cartels and assessing the effects of agreements amongst competitors.
  • Piloting a tender bid-rigging detection programme.
  • Building and staffing a cartels forensic lab.
  • Developing guidelines for establishing the Commission’s jurisdiction in cases of digital collusion that have an effect in South Africa.
Market conduct and abuse of dominance
  • Behaviour identified as inconsistent with competition law in one jurisdiction may also be prevalent in South Africa.
  • Jurisdictional reach – competition authorities may find it difficult to hold to account global entities with limited presence in South Africa.
  • Appropriateness of current competition legislation and regulation to address the challenges of the digital economy.
  • Broader regulatory frameworks in many cases do not apply to new, disruptive technology.
  • Mapping the digital landscape of South Africa ie identifying key emerging digital markets, the current trends of growth, conduct occurring in the market etc.
  • Proactively conducting investigations.
  • Issuing guidelines for key areas of abuse.
  • Instituting a market inquiry into digital markets.
  • Tracking foreign cases against the global giants.
  • Ensuring proactive initiations and global cooperation where conduct is likely to be similar locally.

Regulatory Issues

The paper recognises that competition policy cannot be considered in isolation of the regulatory issues that underpin the digital economy. The Commission is of the view that to derive lasting benefits from the digital economy, the regulatory environment should be conducive to inclusive growth. In order to attain such inclusive growth, the Commission has identified key regulatory issues impeding growth, as well as strategic actions to be taken to remedy such impediments.

The table below sets out a brief summary of the key regulatory issues identified, as well as some of the strategic actions recommended by the Commission.

Key competition issues Commission’s suggested strategic actions
Telecommunications / Broadcasting
  • Access to data services and the digital economy remains problematic, which may result in not only economic exclusion, but also exclusion from full participation in modern society.
  • While mobile broadband coverage may be close to 100%, there is no universal access to broadband in South Africa.
  • The price of data and the cost of digital devices exclude low-income individuals from accessing digital services.
  • New technologies have changed the way that consumers access audio-visual content. However, the unequal application of regulation has resulted in digital platform operators acquiring a competitive advantage over traditional operators, as regulations governing digital platforms are often less onerous.
  • The roll-out of infrastructure (including 5G networks and the creation of a wholesale open access network (WOAN)), especially in low-income and rural areas, should be expedited.
  • Due to the Commission’s inquiry into data pricing in South Africa, the Commission concluded settlement agreements with mobile network operators to reduce the cost of data, with a specific focus on lower-income segments of the market.
  • Regulation should be technology-neutral to “level the playing field” ie the regulation should not differentiate between digital platform operators and traditional operators, in order to reduce regulatory barriers to entry.
Data Protection
  • Consumers cannot rely solely on the Protection of Personal Information Act, 2013 to address privacy-related issues. There is an intersection between competition, privacy and consumer protection.
  • The South African government must not only concern itself with consumer data privacy, but also the control of the individual, national and sensitive data generated by the public sector eg the government must protect itself against a national security breach arising from the cross border flow of information about defence records.
  • A collaborative effort across competition, consumer protection and data protection regulators in relation to matters concerning the digital economy, where transactions involving the transfer of personal information frequency occurs.
  • The South African government should ensure that its agreements with IT service providers adequately govern the principle of “data sovereignty” (ie the right to ownership and use of data).
  • A national digital strategy empowering the South African government to review, investigate and take action against e-commerce that threatens data governance and the localisation of national data.
Financial services
  • Fintech and large technology firms operate outside of traditional sector regulation.
  • A regulatory approach that promotes the inclusion of Fintech and enables their access to the national payments system, banking platforms and provides for their licensing in a fair regulatory landscape.
  • Non-banks (eg mobile network operators) should be able to enter the national payments system; settlement and clearance system.
Regional co-ordination
  • Individual authorities (for example, competition authorities) face resource constraints.
  • Regional or continental co-ordination will result in greater leverage and enforcement resources and possibly consistent regulation of digital firms. Such regional co-ordination could occur via, for example, the African Competition Forum, which consists of 32 African competition regulators.

 

Although many of the Commission’s suggested strategic actions may take a while to implement, it is evident that the digital economy will be prioritised. It is anticipated that the Commission may initiate a market inquiry into the sector, petition amendments to regulations and principle legislation and engage extensively with stakeholders.

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R2K’s Alternatives to Privatised Telecommunication https://yetu.coop/r2ks-alternatives-to-privatised-telecommunication/ Wed, 04 Jul 2018 14:07:00 +0000 https://yetu.coop/?p=1028 In South Africa, as in much of the rest of the world, telecommunication services are concentrated in a handful of monopolistic private companies that reap massive profits at the expense of ordinary South Africans. But South Africa’s vibrant civil society is pushing back against private sector profiteering and, in doing so, is opening up space for […]]]>

In South Africa, as in much of the rest of the world, telecommunication services are concentrated in a handful of monopolistic private companies that reap massive profits at the expense of ordinary South Africans. But South Africa’s vibrant civil society is pushing back against private sector profiteering and, in doing so, is opening up space for alternatives to privatised telecommunications.

This research paper draws on case studies of alternative models from around the world that will hopefully provide examples for South Africa to follow. It further explores R2K’s efforts to democratise communications in the country by advocating alternatives that uphold democratic and egalitarian principles in telecommunications delivery.

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The Internet and Monopoly Capitalism  https://yetu.coop/the-internet-and-monopoly-capitalism/ Sat, 01 Oct 2016 09:49:00 +0000 https://yetu.coop/?p=995 from the Monthly Review by Daniel Auerbach and Brett Clark Without question, the Internet has had a profound influence on the world. As with most technologies, debates rage over whether this development has been positive or negative. Celebrants proclaim with utopian fervor that a new age of democracy has arrived, allowing for decentralized communication, challenges to corporate control, […]]]>

from the Monthly Review by Daniel Auerbach and Brett Clark

Without question, the Internet has had a profound influence on the world. As with most technologies, debates rage over whether this development has been positive or negative. Celebrants proclaim with utopian fervor that a new age of democracy has arrived, allowing for decentralized communication, challenges to corporate control, and mass public participation in the most important decisions confronting humanity.[1] Skeptics point to the ways the Internet has spread ignorance and misinformation instead of knowledge, undermined the ability of artists to earn a living, and exacerbated isolation, unhappiness, and alienation.[2] While these arguments illuminate the potential benefits and drawbacks of the Internet, they tend to ignore or disregard the larger political economy within which the Internet exists. In Digital Disconnect: How Capitalism Is Turning the Internet against Democracy, Robert W. McChesney transcends these one-sided engagements, offering a nuanced analysis of the development of the Internet within the context of monopoly capitalism, revealing both the limitations of this technology in its current state and its massive potential.

McChesney focuses on the tensions and contradictions arising from the Internet’s place within the larger political economy. Capitalism shapes the development of technology, while the latter also influences social relations and interactions within society. The Internet, while presenting some challenges to the capital accumulation process, has become—on the whole—subsumed under its dictates. The Internet’s potential to add to public wealth has been largely directed to increase private riches.[3] Through his historical analysis, McChesney traces the commercialization of the Internet, the ongoing degradation of journalism, and the threat to democracy. These trends follow the long-term dynamics of monopoly capital. Nevertheless, he argues, the present moment is a critical juncture, where the conditions exist for revolutionary change, which would by necessity involve transforming the political-economic system and the Internet.

The Internet, McChesney writes, is the culmination of “government-subsidized-and-directed research during the post-World War II decades, often by the military and leading research universities” (99). The decentralized and open technology of ARPAnet, a key predecessor to the Internet, was largely the creation of researchers and scientists on the fringes of corporate and military institutions. According to McChesney, it was because of this very openness that ARPAnet initially held little interest for large monopoly telecommunications corporations such as AT&T. They found such pursuits, at that point, to be unprofitable (100). It was not until the mid-1990s that the Internet was transformed from a public service (as NSFNet) into a private good, subject to the dictates of exchange value and market forces. This transformation has had a decisive impact on who has access to information, what information is most accessible, and the content of the Internet.

Corporate control over the Internet, according to McChesney, was the result of four pivotal factors: corporate-dominated policy-making in the 1990s; unclear policies regarding the regulation of the Internet; the neoliberal political culture of the ’90s; and the Internet bubble of the late ’90s, which made it seem as if the Internet was ripe for further privatization (104–08). By allowing private interests to take control of the development and design of the Internet, the optimism of a once anti-commercial endeavor turned into a juggernaut for capital accumulation, with substantial social consequences. The Internet was turned into a means to satisfy the needs of capital, rather than the public. With the aid of existing government-sponsored monopolies, the telephone and cable industries were in sole control of the cables and other infrastructure necessary for Internet access. Changes in the legal designation of cable modems as “information services” instead of “telecommunication services” allowed monopolistic cable and telephone companies to dominate the Internet Service Providers (ISP) market. Further consolidation of monopoly control followed. In the 1990s, the ISP market was much more competitive, with a large number of providers. By the mid-2000s, this landscape had changed. McChesney notes that approximately “20 percent of U.S. households have access to no more than a single broadband provider,” and “all but 4 percent of remaining households has, at most, two choices for wired broadband access” (112). Thus, the majority of households effectively do not have a choice when it comes to accessing the Internet.

The subsumption of the Internet under the dictates of capital accumulation has generated a number of contradictory social consequences. For example, even as access to online information and entertainment becomes more widely available, and theoretically open to everyone, actual access remains deeply unequal. As of December 2010, in the United States, 40 percent of households did not have access to broadband connections in their homes. When disaggregated, the divisions become starker: 80 to 100 percent of houses in wealthier neighborhoods had broadband connections, while households in impoverished sections of the same city, had connection rates roughly half that of their rich neighbors (117). Broadband connections are becoming a necessity, as more content turns toward data-intense formats, such as video streaming

, that require faster Internet connections. In regard to an international digital divide, we see contrasting results. By 2019, it is estimated that approximately 51 percent of the global population will be online. While this gap remains vast, it pales in comparison to the divide associated with connected devices (which includes such things as cell phones, tablets, and “smart appliances”). In 2014, in North America, there were, on average, 6.1 connected devices per capita. In Latin America, this number is as low as two connected devices per person, while the Middle East and Africa remain at around one device per person. As the “Internet of things” grows, those who are able to access the web through various devices are able more effectively to utilize the advantages of the Internet compared to those who have fewer gadgets.[4]

Another consequence is that the monopolization of ISPs has a tendency to limit and slow innovations in the quality, speed, and accessibility of broadband access, due to lack of competition. Companies like AT&T and Verizon enjoy exclusive license to large swaths of the electromagnetic spectrum that they allow to lie fallow, so that other ISPs cannot use them (115). As noted above, most areas in the United States have only two real choices for their ISPs; consequently, the United States has one of the most expensive broadband systems in the world, compared to other wealthy nations (114).

There are two other major effects of monopolies on the trajectory of the Internet: the patent grab and the mass proliferation of advertising. Both of these are necessary requirements for accumulating capital in a realm where information is, potentially, freely available. In Internet telecommunications as in other industries, owning patents is quickly becoming a primary means for protecting monopoly power. In a sentence that echoes Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy’s argument in Monopoly Capital, McChesney writes that “patents halt the [innovation] process, but they are fantastic for protecting entrenched monopoly power, litigation costs notwithstanding” (134). Large companies such as Google, Apple, Microsoft, and Amazon have tens of billions of dollars available to purchase patents and build further barriers to entry (137). In 2011, Google spent $12.5 billion on buying Motorola Mobility, not for its existing technology, but primarily to take ownership over the company’s 17,000 patents (134). This proprietary control allows companies to lock consumers into using only their products while transferring power over future development from the intellectual commons to the realm of private wealth.

monopoly-capital-and-internet

Capitalism, of course, requires continuous accumulation and growth, and freely available services, such as most websites, represent a barrier to this process. Advertising—which U.S. companies may write off on their taxes as a business expense—has accordingly become a necessary tool for monetizing and commercializing the Internet. To access free online services, users enter into an often unspoken deal in which they must surrender their personal information. As Bruce Schneier has put it, “If something is free, you’re not the customer; you’re the product.”[5] Websites serve as sources of information and entertainment, but also a means to collect massive amounts of data. As McChesney notes, all of our online habits are recorded through our various devices to generate more targeted advertisements (157). One particularly damaging consequence of this process is the severe narrowing of the range of information and ideas available to Internet users. The data collected on each individual is used to create specific filters that limit exposure to the variety of information potentially available online, while “personalizing” everything from sales pitches tovideos to news stories as part of the hyper-commercialization of the Internet for the sake of capital accumulation (157–58).

Monopoly capitalism in general, and advertising in particular, have important implications for journalism, as the Internet becomes the predominant medium of journalism. McChesney consistently argues that rigorous, independent journalism is a public good necessary for a “democratic society wherein individual liberties are meaningful” (174–75). Here the paradox of the Internet’s potential as a public source of knowledge and its actual development as a vehicle for capital accumulation comes to the fore. Journalism, in the age of the Internet, could remove barriers to entry, allowing for more diverse and critical voices to be heard and to collaborate with one another. Furthermore, as the cost of digital distribution declines, so too could the cost of running a news website. However, the profit motive of capitalism tends to undermine these conditions, as attempts to monetize journalism become paramount and as advertising revenue and social media visibility take precedence over challenging writing and reporting.

According to McChesney, the decline of journalism predates the Internet and can be traced in large part to the broader monopolization of media, and particularly newspapers. In the 1970s and 1980s, as media corporations merged and consolidated, they found that an effective way to increase the bottom line was to decrease editorial budgets, which was in turn accomplished by eliminating journalists and closing news bureaus. Journalism was transformed from a craft dedicated to informing citizens to another means of satisfying corporate investors. With the movement of journalism to the Internet, this problem has worsened and taken on a distinct form. Successful journalism, in the age of monopolization and the Internet, has been reduced to “producing an immense amount of material inexpensively” (188). Online news sources are compelled to collect vast amounts of information about their readers in order to determine what content to display and promote. Based on this information, freelance writers hastily assemble articles tailored to these “popular” search terms. Media companies, equipped with detailed knowledge of their readers, then sell advertising placed next to or within each article.

In an age of “sponsored content” and “promoted posts,” the line between news and advertising is increasingly blurred. Additionally, journalists are expected to write more while earning less, as more content brings in more traffic, which generates increased advertising revenue. This system of exploitation tends to inhibit journalists from adequately investigating and reporting important issues. Instead, they turn to the same sources of established information to produce what amounts to a rehashing of other news sources. The profit motive of monopoly capital has intensified in the digital realm, creating a journalism that remains relatively impotent in the face of corporate greed and government ineptitude, helping reinforce the status quo.

Monopoly control over the development of the Internet has serious implications for the future of democracy around the world. What could be a means of uniting people, a venue for alternative viewpoints, and critically engaged journalism has instead become a site of hyper-commercialization—a tool to facilitate capital accumulation. Monopoly capital, with its tendencies toward privatization of public goods, has narrowed innovation to suit the demands of profit. Such constraints only exacerbate pre-existing inequalities, creating ever wider gaps between classes and social groups. Meanwhile, a select handful of large monopolistic firms have become gatekeepers to information. Online experiences are increasingly funneled to a select few websites: in 2010, the top ten websites accounted for 75 percent of page views in the United States (190). Finally, the problems of journalism are magnified under the advertising-driven profit model of online news.

It is important to note that McChesney does not argue that technology itself is driving this undemocratic process. Rather, it is the general tendencies of monopoly-finance capital, which take on historically distinct forms, mediated through technology. McChesney shows the dialectical tension between the social relations of monopoly capitalism and the technology through which it develops, helping us see the Internet in its material and economic reality, unclouded by either utopian optimism or obstinate pessimism. Furthermore, by virtue of this dialectical analysis, McChesney’s examination avoids the trap of technological or economic determinism, allowing him—and us—to keep sight of the Internet’s liberatory potential. He insists that “battles over the Internet are of central importance for all seeking to build a better society” (232).

We reside at a critical juncture, where new communications technology could be used to challenge established systems; where advertising-driven content is increasingly questioned; where social movements are fighting for radical change; and where political, economic, and social crises are rife. For the digital revolution to be more than a rhetorical flourish, a social revolution must triumph over capitalism, unleashing the potential of democracy.
Notes[1]: See Yochai Benkler: The Penguin and the Leviathan (New York: Crown, 2011); Clay Shirky: Cognitive Surplus (New York: Penguin, 2010).
[2]: See Shaheed Nick Mohammed: The (Dis)information Age (New York: Peter Lang, 2012); Clifford Stoll: High-Tech Heretic (New York: Anchor, 1999); Sherry Turkle: Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other (New York: Basic, 2011).
[3]: See John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney: “The Internet’s Unholy Marriage to Capitalism,”Monthly Review 62, no. 10 (March 2011): 1–30.
[4] :Broadband Commission for Digital Development: Broadband 2015: Broadband as a Foundation for Sustainable Development (Geneva, Switzerland: UNESCO, September 2015), 26, http://broadbandcommission.org.
[5]: Bruce Schneier: Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World (New York: Norton, 2015), 53.

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R2K’s activist’s guide to Internet access https://yetu.coop/r2ks-activists-guide-to-internet-access/ Mon, 30 Mar 2015 08:44:00 +0000 https://yetu.coop/?p=960 ]]>

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R2K’s Lived Cost of Communication https://yetu.coop/r2k-lived-cost/ Sat, 21 Mar 2015 13:42:00 +0000 https://yetu.coop/?p=1023 What is the real cost of communications for ordinary people? R2K, in collaboration with the LINK Centre at Wits, has conducted a study on the lived cost of communications in South Africa. For many poor households in South Africa the cost of high telecommunications can have a crippling effect, forcing many to cut back on […]]]>

What is the real cost of communications for ordinary people? R2K, in collaboration with the LINK Centre at Wits, has conducted a study on the lived cost of communications in South Africa. For many poor households in South Africa the cost of high telecommunications can have a crippling effect, forcing many to cut back on other necessities just to be able to afford airtime.

This study – conducted in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town – explores these lived experiences in depth and asks ordinary South Africans if they feel they are getting the quality of service and value for money they expect.

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